Clientelistic relations between political elite and entrepreneurs in Serbia
Klijentelistički odnosi između političke elite i preduzetnika u Srbiji
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Метаподаци
Приказ свих података о документуАпстракт
Main objective in this article is to describe in more details specific interlinkages
and exchange that is unfolding between political elite and entrepreneurs
as key actors that possess, manage and deploy economic resources in the private sector of the economy. The focus is on the specific mechanisms through which the exchange has been unfolding, as well as on the perception of the functionality of the exchange for the position and interests of both type of actors. The analysis is conducted using empirical findings from the qualitative, in-depth research on political clientelism and party patronage implemented in the spring 2015 upon sample of 55 representatives of political elite, 26 economic actors, 9 interlocking broker and 8 experts.
From the research, it is clear that economic actors have, to put it mildly, ambivalent attitude towards this way of functioning of the market. On the one hand, they feel all the risks they are exposed to: additional expenditure, unforeseen requiremen...ts, interference in their own personnel policy, uncertainty of their business in the long term, unfair competition, demand unpredictability etc. On the other hand, they take this play as given. When they think strategically, they rationally consider alternatives and cost-benefit relationship. Although the desire to get rid of the political embrace is present, the support that comes from that side represents at least a short-term guarantor of their position security. Political actors take this system as given to a certain extent and when describing the mechanisms of its functioning,
they do not question the system itself.
Glavni cilj ovog članka je da detaljnije opiše posebne veze i razmenu
između političke elite i preduzetnika kao ključnih aktera koji poseduju, razvijaju
i upravljaju ekonomskim resursima u privatnom sektoru privrede. Fokus je
na specifičnim mehanizmima kroz koje se razmena odvija, kao i na percepciji
funkcionalnosti razmene za pozicije i interese navedenih aktera. U radu je korišćena kvalitativna analiza empirijskih podataka, istraživanja o političkom klijentelizmu i partijske patronaže koje je sprovedeno proleća 2015. godine na uzorku od 55 predstavnika političke elite, 26 privrednih subjekata, 9 interlokera i 8 stručnjaka. Analize jasno pokazuju da ekonomski akteri imaju, blago rečeno, ambivalentan odnos prema trenutnom načinu funkcionisanja tržišta koje podrazumeva klijentelističe odnose. S jedne strane, oni osećaju sve rizike kojima su izloženi: dodatnim troškovima, nepredviđenim angažmanima, uplitanja u svoju kadrovsku politiku, neizvesnosti poslovanja na duži rok, nelojalnoj ...konkurenciji itd Sa druge strane, oni ova pravila prihvataju kao data. Kada strateški razmišljajju oni racionalno razmotraju alternative i odnos cene i dobiti. Iako je želјa da se oslobode političkog zagrlјaja prisutna, podrška koja dolazi sa te strane predstavlјa makar kratkoročno garant njihove sigurnosti. Politički akteri u velikoj meri ovakav sistem razmene prihvataju kao datost i kada opisuju mehanizme njegovog funkcionisanja, oni ne dovode u pitanje sam sistem.
Кључне речи:
Clientelism / informality / market / Klijentelizam / informalnost / tržišteИзвор:
Sociologija, 2016, 58, 2, 220-238Издавач:
- Beograd : Sociološko naučno društvo Srbije
Финансирање / пројекти:
- This article is based on the research ‘Informal Practices of Capturing Economic Resources by Political Elite: Exploring Party Patronage in Kosovo and Serbia.’
DOI: 10.2298/SOC1602220S
ISSN: 0038-0318
WoS: 000379352200003
Scopus: 2-s2.0-84973442073
Институција/група
IPITY - JOUR AU - Stanojević, Dragan AU - Gundogan, Dragana AU - Babović, Marija PY - 2016 UR - http://ipir.ipisr.org.rs/handle/123456789/849 AB - Main objective in this article is to describe in more details specific interlinkages and exchange that is unfolding between political elite and entrepreneurs as key actors that possess, manage and deploy economic resources in the private sector of the economy. The focus is on the specific mechanisms through which the exchange has been unfolding, as well as on the perception of the functionality of the exchange for the position and interests of both type of actors. The analysis is conducted using empirical findings from the qualitative, in-depth research on political clientelism and party patronage implemented in the spring 2015 upon sample of 55 representatives of political elite, 26 economic actors, 9 interlocking broker and 8 experts. From the research, it is clear that economic actors have, to put it mildly, ambivalent attitude towards this way of functioning of the market. On the one hand, they feel all the risks they are exposed to: additional expenditure, unforeseen requirements, interference in their own personnel policy, uncertainty of their business in the long term, unfair competition, demand unpredictability etc. On the other hand, they take this play as given. When they think strategically, they rationally consider alternatives and cost-benefit relationship. Although the desire to get rid of the political embrace is present, the support that comes from that side represents at least a short-term guarantor of their position security. Political actors take this system as given to a certain extent and when describing the mechanisms of its functioning, they do not question the system itself. AB - Glavni cilj ovog članka je da detaljnije opiše posebne veze i razmenu između političke elite i preduzetnika kao ključnih aktera koji poseduju, razvijaju i upravljaju ekonomskim resursima u privatnom sektoru privrede. Fokus je na specifičnim mehanizmima kroz koje se razmena odvija, kao i na percepciji funkcionalnosti razmene za pozicije i interese navedenih aktera. U radu je korišćena kvalitativna analiza empirijskih podataka, istraživanja o političkom klijentelizmu i partijske patronaže koje je sprovedeno proleća 2015. godine na uzorku od 55 predstavnika političke elite, 26 privrednih subjekata, 9 interlokera i 8 stručnjaka. Analize jasno pokazuju da ekonomski akteri imaju, blago rečeno, ambivalentan odnos prema trenutnom načinu funkcionisanja tržišta koje podrazumeva klijentelističe odnose. S jedne strane, oni osećaju sve rizike kojima su izloženi: dodatnim troškovima, nepredviđenim angažmanima, uplitanja u svoju kadrovsku politiku, neizvesnosti poslovanja na duži rok, nelojalnoj konkurenciji itd Sa druge strane, oni ova pravila prihvataju kao data. Kada strateški razmišljajju oni racionalno razmotraju alternative i odnos cene i dobiti. Iako je želјa da se oslobode političkog zagrlјaja prisutna, podrška koja dolazi sa te strane predstavlјa makar kratkoročno garant njihove sigurnosti. Politički akteri u velikoj meri ovakav sistem razmene prihvataju kao datost i kada opisuju mehanizme njegovog funkcionisanja, oni ne dovode u pitanje sam sistem. PB - Beograd : Sociološko naučno društvo Srbije T2 - Sociologija T1 - Clientelistic relations between political elite and entrepreneurs in Serbia T1 - Klijentelistički odnosi između političke elite i preduzetnika u Srbiji EP - 238 IS - 2 SP - 220 VL - 58 DO - 10.2298/SOC1602220S ER -
@article{ author = "Stanojević, Dragan and Gundogan, Dragana and Babović, Marija", year = "2016", abstract = "Main objective in this article is to describe in more details specific interlinkages and exchange that is unfolding between political elite and entrepreneurs as key actors that possess, manage and deploy economic resources in the private sector of the economy. The focus is on the specific mechanisms through which the exchange has been unfolding, as well as on the perception of the functionality of the exchange for the position and interests of both type of actors. The analysis is conducted using empirical findings from the qualitative, in-depth research on political clientelism and party patronage implemented in the spring 2015 upon sample of 55 representatives of political elite, 26 economic actors, 9 interlocking broker and 8 experts. From the research, it is clear that economic actors have, to put it mildly, ambivalent attitude towards this way of functioning of the market. On the one hand, they feel all the risks they are exposed to: additional expenditure, unforeseen requirements, interference in their own personnel policy, uncertainty of their business in the long term, unfair competition, demand unpredictability etc. On the other hand, they take this play as given. When they think strategically, they rationally consider alternatives and cost-benefit relationship. Although the desire to get rid of the political embrace is present, the support that comes from that side represents at least a short-term guarantor of their position security. Political actors take this system as given to a certain extent and when describing the mechanisms of its functioning, they do not question the system itself., Glavni cilj ovog članka je da detaljnije opiše posebne veze i razmenu između političke elite i preduzetnika kao ključnih aktera koji poseduju, razvijaju i upravljaju ekonomskim resursima u privatnom sektoru privrede. Fokus je na specifičnim mehanizmima kroz koje se razmena odvija, kao i na percepciji funkcionalnosti razmene za pozicije i interese navedenih aktera. U radu je korišćena kvalitativna analiza empirijskih podataka, istraživanja o političkom klijentelizmu i partijske patronaže koje je sprovedeno proleća 2015. godine na uzorku od 55 predstavnika političke elite, 26 privrednih subjekata, 9 interlokera i 8 stručnjaka. Analize jasno pokazuju da ekonomski akteri imaju, blago rečeno, ambivalentan odnos prema trenutnom načinu funkcionisanja tržišta koje podrazumeva klijentelističe odnose. S jedne strane, oni osećaju sve rizike kojima su izloženi: dodatnim troškovima, nepredviđenim angažmanima, uplitanja u svoju kadrovsku politiku, neizvesnosti poslovanja na duži rok, nelojalnoj konkurenciji itd Sa druge strane, oni ova pravila prihvataju kao data. Kada strateški razmišljajju oni racionalno razmotraju alternative i odnos cene i dobiti. Iako je želјa da se oslobode političkog zagrlјaja prisutna, podrška koja dolazi sa te strane predstavlјa makar kratkoročno garant njihove sigurnosti. Politički akteri u velikoj meri ovakav sistem razmene prihvataju kao datost i kada opisuju mehanizme njegovog funkcionisanja, oni ne dovode u pitanje sam sistem.", publisher = "Beograd : Sociološko naučno društvo Srbije", journal = "Sociologija", title = "Clientelistic relations between political elite and entrepreneurs in Serbia, Klijentelistički odnosi između političke elite i preduzetnika u Srbiji", pages = "238-220", number = "2", volume = "58", doi = "10.2298/SOC1602220S" }
Stanojević, D., Gundogan, D.,& Babović, M.. (2016). Clientelistic relations between political elite and entrepreneurs in Serbia. in Sociologija Beograd : Sociološko naučno društvo Srbije., 58(2), 220-238. https://doi.org/10.2298/SOC1602220S
Stanojević D, Gundogan D, Babović M. Clientelistic relations between political elite and entrepreneurs in Serbia. in Sociologija. 2016;58(2):220-238. doi:10.2298/SOC1602220S .
Stanojević, Dragan, Gundogan, Dragana, Babović, Marija, "Clientelistic relations between political elite and entrepreneurs in Serbia" in Sociologija, 58, no. 2 (2016):220-238, https://doi.org/10.2298/SOC1602220S . .