TY  - JOUR
AU  - Stanojević, Dragan
AU  - Gundogan, Dragana
AU  - Babović, Marija
PY  - 2016
UR  - http://ipir.ipisr.org.rs/handle/123456789/849
AB  - Main objective in this article is to describe in more details specific interlinkages
and exchange that is unfolding between political elite and entrepreneurs
as key actors that possess, manage and deploy economic resources in the private sector of the economy. The focus is on the specific mechanisms through which the exchange has been unfolding, as well as on the perception of the functionality of the exchange for the position and interests of both type of actors. The analysis is conducted using empirical findings from the qualitative, in-depth research on political clientelism and party patronage implemented in the spring 2015 upon sample of 55 representatives of political elite, 26 economic actors, 9 interlocking broker and 8 experts.
From the research, it is clear that economic actors have, to put it mildly, ambivalent attitude towards this way of functioning of the market. On the one hand, they feel all the risks they are exposed to: additional expenditure, unforeseen requirements, interference in their own personnel policy, uncertainty of their business in the long term, unfair competition, demand unpredictability etc. On the other hand, they take this play as given. When they think strategically, they rationally consider alternatives and cost-benefit relationship. Although the desire to get rid of the political embrace is present, the support that comes from that side represents at least a short-term guarantor of their position security. Political actors take this system as given to a certain extent and when describing the mechanisms of its functioning,
they do not question the system itself.
AB  - Glavni cilj ovog članka je da detaljnije opiše posebne veze i razmenu
između političke elite i preduzetnika kao ključnih aktera koji poseduju, razvijaju
i upravljaju ekonomskim resursima u privatnom sektoru privrede. Fokus je
na specifičnim mehanizmima kroz koje se razmena odvija, kao i na percepciji
funkcionalnosti razmene za pozicije i interese navedenih aktera. U radu je korišćena kvalitativna analiza empirijskih podataka, istraživanja o političkom klijentelizmu i partijske patronaže koje je sprovedeno proleća 2015. godine na uzorku od 55 predstavnika političke elite, 26 privrednih subjekata, 9 interlokera i 8 stručnjaka. Analize jasno pokazuju da ekonomski akteri imaju, blago rečeno, ambivalentan odnos prema trenutnom načinu funkcionisanja tržišta koje podrazumeva klijentelističe odnose. S jedne strane, oni osećaju sve rizike kojima su izloženi: dodatnim troškovima, nepredviđenim angažmanima, uplitanja u svoju kadrovsku politiku, neizvesnosti poslovanja na duži rok, nelojalnoj konkurenciji itd Sa druge strane, oni ova pravila prihvataju kao data. Kada strateški razmišljajju oni racionalno razmotraju alternative i odnos cene i dobiti. Iako je želјa da se oslobode političkog zagrlјaja prisutna, podrška koja dolazi sa te strane predstavlјa makar kratkoročno garant njihove sigurnosti. Politički akteri u velikoj meri ovakav sistem razmene prihvataju kao datost i kada opisuju mehanizme njegovog funkcionisanja, oni ne dovode u pitanje sam sistem.
PB  - Beograd : Sociološko naučno društvo Srbije
T2  - Sociologija
T1  - Clientelistic relations between political elite and entrepreneurs in Serbia
T1  - Klijentelistički odnosi između političke elite i preduzetnika u Srbiji
EP  - 238
IS  - 2
SP  - 220
VL  - 58
DO  - 10.2298/SOC1602220S
ER  - 

@article{
author = "Stanojević, Dragan and Gundogan, Dragana and Babović, Marija",
year = "2016",
abstract = "Main objective in this article is to describe in more details specific interlinkages
and exchange that is unfolding between political elite and entrepreneurs
as key actors that possess, manage and deploy economic resources in the private sector of the economy. The focus is on the specific mechanisms through which the exchange has been unfolding, as well as on the perception of the functionality of the exchange for the position and interests of both type of actors. The analysis is conducted using empirical findings from the qualitative, in-depth research on political clientelism and party patronage implemented in the spring 2015 upon sample of 55 representatives of political elite, 26 economic actors, 9 interlocking broker and 8 experts.
From the research, it is clear that economic actors have, to put it mildly, ambivalent attitude towards this way of functioning of the market. On the one hand, they feel all the risks they are exposed to: additional expenditure, unforeseen requirements, interference in their own personnel policy, uncertainty of their business in the long term, unfair competition, demand unpredictability etc. On the other hand, they take this play as given. When they think strategically, they rationally consider alternatives and cost-benefit relationship. Although the desire to get rid of the political embrace is present, the support that comes from that side represents at least a short-term guarantor of their position security. Political actors take this system as given to a certain extent and when describing the mechanisms of its functioning,
they do not question the system itself., Glavni cilj ovog članka je da detaljnije opiše posebne veze i razmenu
između političke elite i preduzetnika kao ključnih aktera koji poseduju, razvijaju
i upravljaju ekonomskim resursima u privatnom sektoru privrede. Fokus je
na specifičnim mehanizmima kroz koje se razmena odvija, kao i na percepciji
funkcionalnosti razmene za pozicije i interese navedenih aktera. U radu je korišćena kvalitativna analiza empirijskih podataka, istraživanja o političkom klijentelizmu i partijske patronaže koje je sprovedeno proleća 2015. godine na uzorku od 55 predstavnika političke elite, 26 privrednih subjekata, 9 interlokera i 8 stručnjaka. Analize jasno pokazuju da ekonomski akteri imaju, blago rečeno, ambivalentan odnos prema trenutnom načinu funkcionisanja tržišta koje podrazumeva klijentelističe odnose. S jedne strane, oni osećaju sve rizike kojima su izloženi: dodatnim troškovima, nepredviđenim angažmanima, uplitanja u svoju kadrovsku politiku, neizvesnosti poslovanja na duži rok, nelojalnoj konkurenciji itd Sa druge strane, oni ova pravila prihvataju kao data. Kada strateški razmišljajju oni racionalno razmotraju alternative i odnos cene i dobiti. Iako je želјa da se oslobode političkog zagrlјaja prisutna, podrška koja dolazi sa te strane predstavlјa makar kratkoročno garant njihove sigurnosti. Politički akteri u velikoj meri ovakav sistem razmene prihvataju kao datost i kada opisuju mehanizme njegovog funkcionisanja, oni ne dovode u pitanje sam sistem.",
publisher = "Beograd : Sociološko naučno društvo Srbije",
journal = "Sociologija",
title = "Clientelistic relations between political elite and entrepreneurs in Serbia, Klijentelistički odnosi između političke elite i preduzetnika u Srbiji",
pages = "238-220",
number = "2",
volume = "58",
doi = "10.2298/SOC1602220S"
}

Stanojević, D., Gundogan, D.,& Babović, M.. (2016). Clientelistic relations between political elite and entrepreneurs in Serbia. in Sociologija
Beograd : Sociološko naučno društvo Srbije., 58(2), 220-238.
https://doi.org/10.2298/SOC1602220S

Stanojević D, Gundogan D, Babović M. Clientelistic relations between political elite and entrepreneurs in Serbia. in Sociologija. 2016;58(2):220-238.
doi:10.2298/SOC1602220S .

Stanojević, Dragan, Gundogan, Dragana, Babović, Marija, "Clientelistic relations between political elite and entrepreneurs in Serbia" in Sociologija, 58, no. 2 (2016):220-238,
https://doi.org/10.2298/SOC1602220S . .

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Stanojević, Dragan
AU  - Babović, Marija
AU  - Gundogan, Dragana
PY  - 2016
UR  - http://ipir.ipisr.org.rs/handle/123456789/881
AB  - Dragan Stanojević, Marija Babović
and Dragana Gundogan widely describe actors,
mechanisms and exchanged resources in clientelistic networks in Serbia.
PB  - Belgrade : Secons
T2  - Informal power networks, political patronage and clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo
T2  - clientelism
T2  - informal power networks
T2  - political patronage
T2  - economic actors
T2  - Serbia
T1  - Actors, resources and mechanisms of clientelism in Serbia
EP  - 64
SP  - 44
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ipir_881
ER  - 

@inbook{
author = "Stanojević, Dragan and Babović, Marija and Gundogan, Dragana",
year = "2016",
abstract = "Dragan Stanojević, Marija Babović
and Dragana Gundogan widely describe actors,
mechanisms and exchanged resources in clientelistic networks in Serbia.",
publisher = "Belgrade : Secons",
journal = "Informal power networks, political patronage and clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo, clientelism, informal power networks, political patronage, economic actors, Serbia",
booktitle = "Actors, resources and mechanisms of clientelism in Serbia",
pages = "64-44",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ipir_881"
}

Stanojević, D., Babović, M.,& Gundogan, D.. (2016). Actors, resources and mechanisms of clientelism in Serbia. in Informal power networks, political patronage and clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo
Belgrade : Secons., 44-64.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ipir_881

Stanojević D, Babović M, Gundogan D. Actors, resources and mechanisms of clientelism in Serbia. in Informal power networks, political patronage and clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo. 2016;:44-64.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ipir_881 .

Stanojević, Dragan, Babović, Marija, Gundogan, Dragana, "Actors, resources and mechanisms of clientelism in Serbia" in Informal power networks, political patronage and clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo (2016):44-64,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ipir_881 .

TY  - CHAP
AU  - Babović, Marija
AU  - Stanojević, Dragan
AU  - Pešić, Jelena
AU  - Cvejić, Slobodan
AU  - Gundogan, Dragana
PY  - 2016
UR  - http://ipir.ipisr.org.rs/handle/123456789/882
AB  - In the fourth
chapter, Dragan Stanojević, Marija Babović
and Dragana Gundogan widely describe actors,
mechanisms and exchanged resources in clientelistic networks in Serbia.
PB  - Belgrade : Secons
T2  - Informal power networks, political patronage and clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo
T1  - Methodological considerations
EP  - 25
SP  - 23
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ipir_882
ER  - 

@inbook{
author = "Babović, Marija and Stanojević, Dragan and Pešić, Jelena and Cvejić, Slobodan and Gundogan, Dragana",
year = "2016",
abstract = "In the fourth
chapter, Dragan Stanojević, Marija Babović
and Dragana Gundogan widely describe actors,
mechanisms and exchanged resources in clientelistic networks in Serbia.",
publisher = "Belgrade : Secons",
journal = "Informal power networks, political patronage and clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo",
booktitle = "Methodological considerations",
pages = "25-23",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ipir_882"
}

Babović, M., Stanojević, D., Pešić, J., Cvejić, S.,& Gundogan, D.. (2016). Methodological considerations. in Informal power networks, political patronage and clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo
Belgrade : Secons., 23-25.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ipir_882

Babović M, Stanojević D, Pešić J, Cvejić S, Gundogan D. Methodological considerations. in Informal power networks, political patronage and clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo. 2016;:23-25.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ipir_882 .

Babović, Marija, Stanojević, Dragan, Pešić, Jelena, Cvejić, Slobodan, Gundogan, Dragana, "Methodological considerations" in Informal power networks, political patronage and clientelism in Serbia and Kosovo (2016):23-25,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ipir_882 .

TY  - CONF
AU  - Babović, Marija
AU  - Stanojević, Dragan
AU  - Gundogan, Dragana
PY  - 2015
UR  - http://ipir.ipisr.org.rs/handle/123456789/880
AB  - The aim of this paper is to examine the crucial actors, resources and in-formal mechanisms of the party patronage within Serbia's political fir-ld. Taking into account that important parts of political and economic I-F.-- production are held beyond institutional channels, the goal is therefore to represent key informal power networks, channels and arrangements in Serbia between political and economic actors on the national level. A particular study had been conducted in Serbia over the past year, and consisted of 98 face-to-face semi-structured interviews with various ex¬perts, political and economic actors (i.e. people within high public ad¬ministrative positions, politically influential people, appointed members in public enterprises, executives/managers/owners in private compa¬nies). The theoretical framework was based on concepts developed as an alternative to the institutional approach, such as clientelism, informality and party patronage (Kitschelt, Wilkinson, 2007; Kitschelt, 2000; Helmke, Levitsky, 2004, Ledeneva, 1998, 2013). The results indicated that political parties are the key actors in shaping informal relations inside the politi¬cal arena. Political competition -and the necessity to provide funding for these organizations- represents a crucial factor for structuring informal, clientelistic relations and party patronage. Economic actors are, in most cases, adaptable to the rules and party requests which are -more or less-fixed. Furthermore, the results showed that the power networks consist of the party cadre and institutions, and are therefore representative of more exclusive and centralized systems. Although these systems are not monolithic, they do however have a parallel function with several inter¬est groups which consequently, leads to competitions and conflicts in- de (and among) politicalparties.
PB  - Belgrade : Secons, development inititative group
PB  - Belgrade : Institute for Sociological research, University of Belgrade
C3  - Informality in Central and South-Eastern Europe : Linkages between political and economic actors
T1  - The Main Characteristic and Mechanisms of Party Patronage in Serbia
EP  - 35
SP  - 35
UR  - https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ipir_880
ER  - 

@conference{
author = "Babović, Marija and Stanojević, Dragan and Gundogan, Dragana",
year = "2015",
abstract = "The aim of this paper is to examine the crucial actors, resources and in-formal mechanisms of the party patronage within Serbia's political fir-ld. Taking into account that important parts of political and economic I-F.-- production are held beyond institutional channels, the goal is therefore to represent key informal power networks, channels and arrangements in Serbia between political and economic actors on the national level. A particular study had been conducted in Serbia over the past year, and consisted of 98 face-to-face semi-structured interviews with various ex¬perts, political and economic actors (i.e. people within high public ad¬ministrative positions, politically influential people, appointed members in public enterprises, executives/managers/owners in private compa¬nies). The theoretical framework was based on concepts developed as an alternative to the institutional approach, such as clientelism, informality and party patronage (Kitschelt, Wilkinson, 2007; Kitschelt, 2000; Helmke, Levitsky, 2004, Ledeneva, 1998, 2013). The results indicated that political parties are the key actors in shaping informal relations inside the politi¬cal arena. Political competition -and the necessity to provide funding for these organizations- represents a crucial factor for structuring informal, clientelistic relations and party patronage. Economic actors are, in most cases, adaptable to the rules and party requests which are -more or less-fixed. Furthermore, the results showed that the power networks consist of the party cadre and institutions, and are therefore representative of more exclusive and centralized systems. Although these systems are not monolithic, they do however have a parallel function with several inter¬est groups which consequently, leads to competitions and conflicts in- de (and among) politicalparties.",
publisher = "Belgrade : Secons, development inititative group, Belgrade : Institute for Sociological research, University of Belgrade",
journal = "Informality in Central and South-Eastern Europe : Linkages between political and economic actors",
title = "The Main Characteristic and Mechanisms of Party Patronage in Serbia",
pages = "35-35",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ipir_880"
}

Babović, M., Stanojević, D.,& Gundogan, D.. (2015). The Main Characteristic and Mechanisms of Party Patronage in Serbia. in Informality in Central and South-Eastern Europe : Linkages between political and economic actors
Belgrade : Secons, development inititative group., 35-35.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ipir_880

Babović M, Stanojević D, Gundogan D. The Main Characteristic and Mechanisms of Party Patronage in Serbia. in Informality in Central and South-Eastern Europe : Linkages between political and economic actors. 2015;:35-35.
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ipir_880 .

Babović, Marija, Stanojević, Dragan, Gundogan, Dragana, "The Main Characteristic and Mechanisms of Party Patronage in Serbia" in Informality in Central and South-Eastern Europe : Linkages between political and economic actors (2015):35-35,
https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_ipir_880 .